永野 護

Focusing on the sukuk market in Malaysia from 2000–2017, this study estimates the degree of each sample issuer information asymmetry and investigates how it influences sukuk issuance and how it differs by sukuk type. First, we find that a cost-plus-sales-based Murabahah sukuk is available for all sukuk issuers, even though the degree of information asymmetry is high. Second, a lease-based Ijarah sukuk can be chosen by high information asymmetric firms only when the firm has qualified collateral assets. Third, only a low information asymmetric firm can choose a profit-and-loss sharing-based Musyarakah sukuk. Therefore, we conclude that sukuk issuance also follows a financial hierarchy in accordance with the agency costs of each financial methodology required when a specific sukuk is chosen.

This study investigates the factors that promote a bank borrower to issue sukuk rather than conventional debt security in Malaysia and Indonesia from 2000 to 2014. First, our empirical results show that a bank borrower is likely to approach the sukuk market as the funding size grows and if the firm is valued highly. Second, we find that under high information asymmetry, a firm with a high stock price and large funding demand prefers sukuk issuance to conventional debt. We conclude that firms use the sukuk market as an intermediate funding market when the funding demand is too large to borrow from banks and the information asymmetry is too high for them to approach the conventional debt market. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Using security issuer data from Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates from the 2001–2013 period, this study investigates how Islamic bond (Sukuk) issuers differ from conventional debt and equity issuers. An international comparative analysis of these three types of security issuers yields three key insights. First, accessibility to the Sukuk market is essential in choosing Sukuk issuance other determinants will not promote the use of Sukuk, unless this requirement is first satisfied. Second, the low degree of financial constraints on a firm promotes Sukuk issuance, once the required condition of issuer accessibility to the Sukuk market is satisfied. Third, undervaluation of a firm in the pre-issuance period also encourages Sukuk issuance, once the issuer's Sukuk market accessibility condition is satisfied. Taken together, we conclude that Sukuk issuance is preferred along with market timing, once the pecking-order conditions of market accessibility are satisfied.