平尾 由紀子

This paper analyzes firms' location choices and information acquisition in a model of product differentiation with trend. The presence of an uncertain trend spot induces the firms not to follow the principle of maximal differentiation, unless the trend spot is expected to be near the ends of the city. Second, each firm has an incentive to acquire information about the exact trend spot. Consumer surplus is also higher when both firms are informed. Third, firms' choice of product differentiation is excessive relative to the social optimum. Furthermore, in the social optimum, welfare is also higher when the planner is informed.

This paper studies how competitive balance in the Japanese professional baseball teams has changed over time, and estimates the effect of competitive balance on attendance demand for baseball games. Nippon Professional Baseball Organization (the 'NPB' hereinafter) consists of the Central League and the Pacific League, and there are six teams in each league. In 2004, a series of changes took place in the Pacific League, including the merger of the two existing teams, the entry of a new team, the first-ever strike by ball players, and the relocation of a franchise team from Tokyo to Hokkaido. I estimate attendance at home games of the twelve teams for the period 1958 to 2013, and examine whether the Pacific League has become more competitive after the changes in 2004. The main results are: (1) The structural break in 2004 has increased competitive balance of the Pacific League relative to the Central League; and (2) home-team attendance is positively related to stadium capacity, the team's winning rate, previous year's attendance---indicating fan loyalty---, per capita real GDP, and competitive balance. The results imply that the leagues and the teams should take measures to promote competitive balance in order to increase attendance.

This article measures efficiency of the top 50 business schools in the United States in 2006, using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. We use peer assessment (to represent school quality) and average Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) scores (to represent student ability) as inputs and average starting salary and the percent of graduates employed upon graduation as outputs. The 50 business schools consist of 27 private schools and 23 public schools, and their efficiency scores are compared. We find that although technical efficiencies of private and public schools are both high, scale and overall efficiencies of the public schools are lower than those of the private schools. And most public schools exhibit Increasing Returns To Scale (IRTS). The returns to scale in this article refers to increases in the output measures - starting salary and the employment rates - in response to increases in the quality of inputs - peer assessment and the average GMAT scores. Hence, schools that exhibit IRTS will experience more than proportionate increases in starting salary and the employment rates by raising the quality of inputs. The policy implication is that for many public schools, efficiency will be improved if they could improve school and student quality levels.

This article tests economies of scale and economies of scope for the property-casualty insurance companies in Japan. We fit a composite cost function to a set of Japanese firms over the period from 1980 to 1995 and employ an error components model. Our main findings are as follows. First, statistically significant economies of scale are observed in both Japanese firms and foreign firms operating in Japan. Second, economies of scope are also statistically significant for Japanese firms and most of the foreign insurers between the "third sector" products and the rest of the property-casualty insurance lines.

This paper analyzes optimal contracts for financing risky new projects in a two-period agency model. The principal and the agent both learn about the project quality, and the agent's unobservable actions affect the learning process. The parties have access to the credit market. Compared to the short-term contracts, the long-term contract induces the agent to work harder (less hard) in period one if his marginal effort in the first period increases (reduces) the value of information. In both cases, the long-term contract enables the parties to learn more about the project type.