三上 和彦

This paper explores the implications of transferable shares in a cooperative firm as compared with shares in a capitalist firm. We argue that a cooperative firm issuing transferable shares is isomorphic to a capitalist firm as a business organization, while maintaining its essential characteristic of being owned not by capitalists but by members as input providers or output receivers. Based on this observation, we explore the possibility of developing a unified business law that regulates both capitalist and cooperative firms within a single legal framework.

It is well known that many non-profit firms coexist with government firms in industries that provide collectively consumed goods and services, such as education, healthcare, social services, and art and culture. This paper explores the specific circumstances under which non-profit firms can emerge as alternatives to the government. We show that a non-profit firm emerges only when the residents' median preference for a collective good is significantly low. This finding implies that, somewhat paradoxically, a non-profit firm emerges to replace the government and provide a collective good only when the majority of residents consider the good non-essential.

Purpose: It is generally recognized that consumer cooperatives are at a disadvantage when raising capital as compared to conventional capitalist firms. The purpose of this paper is to explore a method for consumer cooperatives to issue transferable membership shares as financial securities and raise non-redeemable equity. The author examines if such a method can strengthen the financial viability of consumer cooperatives in the market economy. Design/methodology/approach: The author first explain the mechanism by using diagrams of the circular flow of factors of production and the product. The author then developed a simple formal model and compare the amount of equity capital raised by a capitalist firm and a consumer cooperative. Findings: The author found that the amount of equity that a consumer cooperative can raise by issuing shares of membership is greater than the amount of equity that a capitalist firm can raise by issuing shares of stock. Research limitations/implications: More research effort is required to apply the theory discussed in this paper for practical use. Social implications: Consumer cooperatives have many good features that conventional capitalist firms do not have. However, the scale and scope of consumer cooperatives have been quite limited partly because of the problem of finance. The method presented in this paper is expected to improve the financial viability of consumer cooperatives and promotes their activities in the market economy. Originality/value: This paper regards the membership of a consumer cooperative as a kind of financial security and as a tool for procuring capital for investment. As far as the author knows, the present paper is the first one that presents such a concept.