近藤 隆史, 福田 直樹, 相原 基大, 窪田 祐一
経営と経済 89(1) 35-56 2009年6月
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how changes in performance measurement systems (PMS) as management control systems (Simons,1995,2000) affect organizational behavior and organizational performance. Using survey data from 127 manufacturing executive officers of manufacturing firms in Japan, this study applies structural equation modeling methods to examine the relationships among changes in the design of PMS, the diagnostic/interactive use of PMS, the opportunistic behavior of subordinates and organizational performance. The results of this paper are as follows. First, increasingly strategic performance measures have influenced both the increased reliance on non-financial measures in the performance evaluation and compensation and the increased importance of financial performance in managerial compensation. Second, the increased reliance on non-financial measures in the performance evaluation process, in turn, has facilitated the diagnostic use of PMS. Third, the increased importance of financial performance in the compensation process has resulted in increasingly interactive use of PMS. Forth, changes in both the diagnostic and interactive use of the system have improved organizational performance. Specifically, changes in the interactive use of PMS have discouraged opportunistic behavior of subordinate employees, which has led to improved organizational performance.