Shinya Aimatsu

With reference to the moral error theory in contemporary meta-ethics, I have constructed an empiricist moral error theory from Hume's moral philosophy.

Online published February 15, 2024. I argued that in Hume's moral philosophy, the "moral sentiments" that are supposed to constitute moral judgments are in fact fictional sentiments that are retroactively assumed from the use of moral language.

Based on the distinction between the concept and substance of morality and the attention to the function of moral language, I discussed the normativity or rationality of morality in Hume's moral philosophy and presented a possible error-theoretic interpretation of it.

I discussed the normativity or value-ladenness that infiltrates the concept of risk through the introduction and examination of Niklas Möller's article, "The Concepts of Risk and Safety" (2012).

Through the introduction and examination of Jonas Olson's article, "Projectionalism and Error in Hume's Ethics" (2011), I have shown the possibility of an error theoretic interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy.

This is the English version of my article "Hume's Moral Philosophy and Normativity," in which I have restricted my discussion to theories of justice, value, and moral evaluation and added some textual evidence.

I have examined whether Hume's moral philosophy contains his "normative claims" in multiple contexts and concluded in the negative.

I argued that the "general point of view" in Hume's moral philosophy consists of two aspects: universal form and diverse content.

I discussed how moral considerations affect our intuition of "intentional action" through an introduction and examination of Joshua Knobe's article, "The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology" (2008), which employs the methods of experimental philosophy.

Based on an analogy with Hume's theory of justice, I argued that the "general point of view" in his theory of moral judgment is an artificial point of view established by human convention.

I argued that the "general point of view" in Hume's moral philosophy is a variable and gradational perspective, determined by the type and degree of concern for oneself and others that is generally expected.

I introduced and commented on D. S. Wilson's article, "On the Relationship between Evolutionary and Psychological Definitions of Altruism and Selfishness" (1998).

I have shown through an analysis of the "general point of view" that in Hume's moral philosophy, the evaluation of "natural virtues" is much more situation-dependent and requires more sensitive examination than that of "artificial virtues," and on this basis, I have argued that what cultivates our morality is the practice of evaluating natural virtues.