James, O. (Depa, me, c, University of Exeter)Petrovsky, N, the Martin School of, Public Policy, Administration at, the, University of Kentucky, Nakamura,A, Musashino University
2016 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting & Exhibition 2016年9月1日 American Political Science Association
Politically neutral, merit based, employment of officials is an important model of administration and contrasts with models where politicians affect employment. Despite long running interest in these models there is surprising little systematic evidence about how employment in supposedly neutral, merit based models operates in practice. We examine if the hazard is higher when there is incongruence between ministers or party of government that appointed the Permanent Secretary and that in place at a particular point in time. The findings show that the conventional wisdom about this system needs to be revised, and this has implications for the often favourable comparisons made with systems involving political appointees.