Ohtani Hiroshi

Abstract Scholars have recently discussed the notion of moral certainty, inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion concerning empirical certainty in On Certainty. The idea is that within the basic commitments of our moral practices exists something objectively certain – the moral hinges on which our practices turn. Here, I explore this notion of moral certainty to illuminate an important aspect of our moral thinking. I argue that, indeed, there exist moral hinges, including our commitments to people’s equal moral worth and the wrongness of killing innocent, non-threatening people. Additionally, I point out that moral hinges provide the starting point for our clarificatory moral thinking. Importantly, clarification here is not merely a preparation for a morally-important sort of thinking, but a creative process that constitutes an important aspect of such thinking. The present article illustrates this aspect and thereby contributes not just to Wittgenstein scholarship, but also to our understanding of moral thinking’s nature.

<title>Abstract</title> Dominant interpretations of Plato's <italic>Crito</italic> attempt to reconstruct the text deductively, taking the arguments in the famous Laws’ speech as consisting solely in the application of general principles to facts. It is thus conceived that the principles and facts are grasped independently of each other, and then the former are applied to the latter, subsequently reaching the conclusion that Socrates must not escape. Following the lead of Cora Diamond, who argues against this ‘generalist interpretation’, I argue that the Laws’ speech essentially involves an exercise of our moral imagination through which both principles and the facts to which they apply are grasped. This is not to say that a deductive argument is absent from the Laws’ speech. Rather, for the first time, we understand how the deductive arguments in the Laws’ speech can function through imagining a life in which these arguments make sense. The <italic>Crito</italic> is an attempt to exercise the readers’ imagination, thereby presenting ethics that is both personal and objective. Understanding the Laws’ arguments essentially requires the readers’ imaginative involvement with Socrates’ personal story, but they still have objective import.

<title>Abstract</title>This paper provides new tools for philosophical argument analysis and fresh empirical foundations for ‘critical’ ordinary language philosophy. Language comprehension routinely involves stereotypical inferences with contextual defeaters. J.L. Austin’s <italic>Sense and Sensibilia</italic> first mooted the idea that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from verbal case-descriptions drive some philosophical paradoxes; these engender philosophical problems that can be resolved by exposing the underlying fallacies. We build on psycholinguistic research on salience effects to explain when and why even perfectly competent speakers cannot help making stereotypical inferences which are contextually inappropriate. We analyse a classical paradox about perception (‘argument from illusion’), suggest it relies on contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance-verbs, and show that the conditions we identified as leading to contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are met in formulations of the paradox. Three experiments use a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task to document the predicted inappropriate inferences, in English, German, and Japanese. The cross-linguistic study allows us to assess the wider relevance of the proposed analysis. Our findings open up new perspectives for ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy.

In &lt;I&gt;On Certainty&lt;/I&gt;, Wittgenstein argues that world-pictures are things that stand fast. However, what do the sentences about them express? Some say that they are propositions, while others regard them as grammatical rules. In this paper, I investigate these two interpretations and one other alternative, and assert that all of them have serious flaws (section 2). I then argue for my interpretation, which affirms that they are pictures, as the name &quot;world-picture&quot; suggests (section 3). By citing the notion of a picture in &lt;I&gt;Philosophical Investigations&lt;/I&gt;, I argue that a picture is a rough conception that is calling for a clarification, and that it is different from propositions or rules. In my coclusion, I respond to an objection (section 4).

On the standard interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, it is supposed that he accepts the view that language is governed by rules. Many interpreters, explicitly or implicitly, think that Wittgenstein is committed to the view that the correct uses of words are determined by their rules.In my paper, I argue that the standard interpretation is incorrect as an interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs later thought on language and rules. First, in my view,Wittgensteinʼs position is that we explain the meaning of a word by rules, when it is necessary. However, when it is not necessary, we do not operate according to rules.Second, the standard interpretation ascribes to Wittgenstein a dogmatic philosophical method, which he in fact tries to avoid. On the standard interpretation, a rule for a word is supposed to be the source of normativity, so that, by citing the rules that Wittgenstein or Wittgensteinians identify, we can reject some philosophical assertions as nonsense. To think that only Wittgenstein or Wittgensteinians can identify the right rules in philosophical discussions is dogmatic, however, and by carefully surveying the text of Philosophical Investigations we can see that he avoids such dogmatism.In section 1 of my paper, I explain the standard interpretation. In section 2, I review the general points of Wittgensteinʼs discussion of rule-following and argue that the standard interpretation has a problem here. In section 3, I show that the Wittgensteinʼs texts cited by Glock, a prominent supporter of the standard interpretation, as the evidence for his interpretation do not support it. In section 4, by carefully investigating the remarks that concern rule-following in Philosophical Investigations, I argue that the standard interpretation misunderstands the method and aim of Wittgensteinʼs argument. Finally, in section 5, I argue that the standard interpretation has serious flaws as an interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs view of rules.

『哲学探究』におけるウィトゲンシュタインの真理論を検討した。まず『哲学探究』において真理概念が検討されている134－137節を詳細に見ていくことで、ウィトゲンシュタインに真理のデフレ理論を帰す通常の解釈には、根拠が無いことを明らかにした。そのうえで、ウィトゲンシュタインは真理の理解は言語ゲームにおいて、命題の真偽の評価の仕方の習得と分かちがたく結び付いているという点を強調しているとした。また、このウィトゲンシュタイン解釈の哲学的な含意についてもコメントした。

特に分析哲学と科学論に焦点を当て、高校倫理の教育と大学における哲学・倫理学教育をつなぐ段階的で総合的な解説を行った。

生物学と物理学の関係についての論争をサーヴェイし、生物学が物理学に還元不可能な自律した科学であると論じた。

近年の矛盾律をめぐる哲学論争を過去のウィトゲンシュタインの矛盾律に関する見解をめぐる論争と比較し、両者がともにクワイン的な科学哲学の中での論理の改訂という枠組みの中に留まるものであることを明らかにした。

飢饉を巡るFAD理論とエンタイトルメント・アプローチを倫理的観点から整理しそれをアマルティア・センの福祉についての潜在能力アプローチと関係付ける。その上で、センの潜在能力アプローチとロールズの基本財アプローチの論争を検討し、ヒラリー・パトナムの内在的実在論の立場により提出された基本的な客観性の概念から潜在能力アプローチを支持しうると論じた。

ウィトゲンシュタインが論じた「規則の問題」の『哲学探究』における位置付けについて論じた。また、その中で私的言語論からユニークな哲学的問題を取り出しうると論じた。

「最後の審判がある」のような宗教的信念について、この信念を表現する文の意味という言語哲学的観点からアプローチし、ダメットやウィトゲンシュタインの立場が宗教的実践の理解にどのように寄与するのかということを検討した。また特に宗教的実践と倫理の関係を分析した。

日本では従来あまり紹介されてこなかった確率の解釈の問題領域をサーベイし、その中で特に傾向性解釈に対して問題となるハンフリーズのパラドクスに対して提案されてきたいくつかの解決が不十分であることを論じた

現代認識論およびウィトゲンシュタイン解釈においてマイケル・ウィリアムズが推進している「ウィトゲンシュタイン的文脈主義」の立場を批判的に検討し、これが非常に興味深い論点を含みながらもウィトゲンシュタイン解釈としても、認識論上の立場としても不十分であると論じた

ヒラリー・パトナムが近年提唱している「自然な実在論」と、それまでの彼の立場である「内在的実在論」との関係を検討し、知覚や心の哲学についての大きな変化は認められるものの合理性を重視し形而上学的実在論を拒否するという基本的な立場には変更がないということを確認した。

「あいまいさ」の問題に対してキット・ファインの提唱したスーパーヴァリュエイショニズムの検討から、文脈的差異に注目することがあいまいさの問題の解決につながるということを示し、また近年の文脈主義の文脈概念が不十分なものであると論じた。そして、パースやウィトゲンシュタインのあいまいさの取り扱いの中にそれらを乗り越える契機があると結論した。

Timothy Williamsonの著書&lt;I&gt;Knowledge and its Limits&lt;/I&gt;三章の要約とコメント。