Shigehiro Yuasa

In the United States, there was a definite formula for China at least during the Second World War. This was called the policy of a "strong and unified China," which was a part of F.D. Roosevelt's "Four policemen concept." As for Japan's China policy, on the contrary, it is difficult for us to trace a coherent view on China. Japan could not develop a consistent China policy. Rather, we can find that two different stances toward China constituted Japanese China policy in the 1940s. These were a "weak and divided China" and "China as an anti-Western power." The first one appeared almost at the onset of the 20th century, while the second one was developed during the 1930s and was strengthened after the Pacific War broke out. Those who advocated the idea of a "weak and divided China" were also the advocates of the Japanese invasion of China. They often insisted that China was not a unified nation state but a multi-national country, and considered that Chinese government could not manage its multi-national elements. They even thought that China was just the name of a great civilization of the past. The Japanese Army thus justified its activities in Manchuria or North China (Huabei). Manchuria was outside of China, while North China, though indeed a part of a divided China, was a special region which was thought to be a different from the other parts of China. After the Pacific War began, Japan tried to use the logic of treating China as an anti-Western ally. However, it was fruitless to expect that Japan could cooperate with China within the framework of this logic, because it was too self-complacent and self-centered a view. Also, many Japanese still clung to the concept of a "weak and divided China." Therefore, China could not share this anti-western sentiment with Japan in any real sense. As for America, it made every effort to realize a "strong and unified China" during the war. At first, the U.S. gave a lot of assistance to Chiang Kai-shek in spite of many criticism in both China and America. Once Americans began to doubt the efficacy of the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalists) war efforts, they began to urge the Nationalists to reform their corrupt elements. They even thought of a joint operation with the Chinese Communists, not only because they tried to utilize the efficient Communist Army, but also because they wanted to work toward a future common front between the Nationalists and the Communists. However, America's intention was not realized in spite of Roosevelt's serious efforts, mainly because of the stubbornness of both parties. When World War II was over, both Kuomintang and the Communists looked for a chance to establish hegemony in Chinese politics. In this situation, the U.S., which still sought for a united front, sent General George C. Marshall to China to mediate between them. For all his 13-month efforts, Marshall failed to reconcile the Nationalists and the Communists, and the civil war resumed soon after his return. Then the U.S. adopted a stance of "wait and see" toward the Chinese civil war, though it gradually came to consider the situation in China in terms of the cold war. The view of a "strong and unified China" was, with the beginnings of the Korean War, finally replaced by the reality of "China as an enemy of the cold war". After its defeat in the Pacific War, the Japanese government could not formulate its own China policy because of the Allied Powers' occupation. However, there were some Japanese who tried to work toward a new situation in China by collaborating with the Kuomintang's war efforts against the Communists. One example was when some Japanese soldiers stayed behind Shanxi Province, they collaborated with General Yan Xi-shan. Another was the case of the so-called "Baituan," which was a secret advisory group of the Nationalists Army, its members were former Japanese Army officers. These activities may be considered as reactions to the cold war in Asia; however, to do so is completely misleading. The Japanese soldiers' efforts in Shanxi was not a reaction to the cold war. Their activity was, on the contrary, a strange amalgam of the two old views-a "weak and divided China" and "China as an anti-Western power"; it did not have any implications for the future. As for "Baituan," it may be thought to be a Japanese reaction to the cold war in Asia to some extent, but it was not a product of the cold war, at least on the Japanese side. In conclusion, after WWII, Japan could not produce any new view toward China to replace the two older ones a "weak and divided China" and "China as an anti-Western power."