研究者業績

Kuninori Nakagawa

  (中川 訓範)

Profile Information

Affiliation
Professor, School of Economics and Management, University of Hyogo
Degree
PH.D., Economics(Kyoto University)

ORCID ID
 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2429-7630
researchmap Member ID
7000011526

Research Interests

 2

Papers

 8
  • Kuninori Nakagawa
    International Journal of Game Theory, 52 607-627, Jun, 2023  Peer-reviewed
    Abstract We consider the explicit introduction of firms’ choice of location into Varian’s model of sales. In our model, firms compete for both uninformed and informed consumers in a two-stage spatial competition model in which firms choose price and location. We obtain a result where both prices and locations are randomized in the subgame perfect equilibrium. The difference between each firm’s choice of location in the subgame perfect equilibrium is neither purely maximized at both ends of a line nor purely minimized at the center. Also, the expected profits in a subgame perfect equilibrium are equal to the maximum profit from an uninformed market in the absence of informed consumers. Thus, even when product differentiation is explicitly introduced into a Varian-type model, Varian’s implication can be retained; the opportunity for profit in an informed market is lost due to competition.
  • Taro Kanatani, Kuninori Nakagawa
    Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 16(1), Mar 23, 2023  Peer-reviewedCorresponding author
  • Satoru Morita, Kuninori Nakagawa
    Journal of Theoretical Biology, 558 111367-111367, Feb, 2023  Peer-reviewed
  • Kentaro Fukumoto, Charles T. McClean, Kuninori Nakagawa
    Nature Medicine, 27 2111-2119, Dec, 2021  Peer-reviewed
  • Ryosuke Ishii, Kuninori Nakagawa
    Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 49(2) 219-235, May, 2015  Peer-reviewedCorresponding author
    We consider the relationship between passenger behaviour and airline behaviour through flight scheduling and price competition. We focus on how an option for early ticket purchase affects the competition between two airlines. In our model, airlines set two ticket prices for passengers: one before the passengers know when they would take the flight; and the other after they know the most preferable time to take the flight. We find that in a subgame perfect equilibrium, airlines operate flights on an efficient schedule from the perspective of passengers.

Misc.

 4

Books and Other Publications

 1

Presentations

 22

Teaching Experience

 23

Academic Activities

 4

Social Activities

 5