Shinya Aimatsu

With reference to the moral error theory in contemporary meta-ethics, I have constructed an empiricist moral error theory from Hume's moral philosophy.

Online published February 15, 2024. I argued that in Hume's moral philosophy, the "moral sentiments" that are supposed to constitute moral judgments are in fact fictional sentiments that are retroactively assumed from the use of moral language.

Based on the distinction between the concept and substance of morality and the attention to the function of moral language, I discussed the normativity or rationality of morality in Hume's moral philosophy and presented a possible error-theoretic interpretation of it.

I discussed the normativity or value-ladenness that infiltrates the concept of risk through the introduction and examination of Niklas Möller's article, "The Concepts of Risk and Safety" (2012).

Through the introduction and examination of Jonas Olson's article, "Projectionalism and Error in Hume's Ethics" (2011), I have shown the possibility of an error theoretic interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy.